翻訳と辞書
Words near each other
・ Security Airster S-1
・ Security alarm
・ Security Alert Team
・ Security analysis
・ Security Analysis (book)
・ Security and Freedom Ensured Act
・ Security and Human Rights
・ Security and Intelligence Agency
・ Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator
・ Security and Intelligence Division
・ Security and Intelligence Services (India)
・ Security and Maintenance
・ Security and Peace
・ Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America
・ Security and Public Order Division
Security and safety features new to Windows Vista
・ Security and Trust Services API for J2ME
・ Security appliance
・ Security AppScan
・ Security Armored Express
・ Security as a service
・ Security Assertion Markup Language
・ Security association
・ Security assurance
・ Security Attribute Modulation Protocol
・ Security awareness
・ Security bag
・ Security Bank
・ Security Bank (New Auburn, Wisconsin)
・ Security Bank Ballpark


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Security and safety features new to Windows Vista : ウィキペディア英語版
There are a number of security and safety features new to Windows Vista, most of which are not available in any prior Microsoft Windows operating system release.Beginning in early 2002 with Microsoft's announcement of its Trustworthy Computing initiative, a great deal of work has gone into making Windows Vista a more secure operating system than its predecessors. Internally, Microsoft adopted a "Security Development Lifecycle" with the underlying ethos of "Secure by design, secure by default, secure in deployment". New code for Windows Vista was developed with the SDL methodology, and all existing code was reviewed and refactored to improve security.Some specific areas where Windows Vista introduces new security and safety mechanisms include User Account Control, parental controls, Network Access Protection, a built-in anti-malware tool, and new digital content protection mechanisms.==User Account Control==(詳細はUser Account Controlを参照)''User Account Control'' is a new infrastructure that requires user consent before allowing any action that requires administrative privileges. With this feature, all users, including users with administrative privileges, run in a standard user mode by default, since most applications do not require higher privileges. When some action is attempted that needs administrative privileges, such as installing new software or changing system settings, Windows will prompt the user whether to allow the action or not. If the user chooses to allow, the process initiating the action is elevated to a higher privilege context to continue. While standard users need to enter a username and password of an administrative account to get a process elevated (''Over-the-shoulder Credentials''), an administrator can choose to be prompted just for consent or ask for credentials.UAC asks for credentials in a ''Secure Desktop'' mode, where the entire screen is faded out and temporarily disabled, to present only the elevation UI. This is to prevent spoofing of the UI or the mouse by the application requesting elevation. If the application requesting elevation does not have focus before the switch to ''Secure Desktop'' occurs, then its taskbar icon blinks, and when focussed, the elevation UI is presented (however, it is not possible to prevent a malicious application from silently obtaining the focus).Since the ''Secure Desktop'' allows only highest privilege ''System'' applications to run, no user mode application can present its dialog boxes on that desktop, so any prompt for elevation consent can be safely assumed to be genuine. Additionally, this can also help protect against shatter attacks, which intercept Windows inter-process messages to run malicious code or spoof the user interface, by preventing unauthorized processes from sending messages to high privilege processes. Any process that wants to send a message to a high privilege process must get itself elevated to the higher privilege context, via UAC.Applications written with the assumption that the user will be running with administrator privileges experienced problems in earlier versions of Windows when run from limited user accounts, often because they attempted to write to machine-wide or system directories (such as ''Program Files'') or registry keys (notably HKLM) UAC attempts to alleviate this using ''File and Registry Virtualization'', which redirects writes (and subsequent reads) to a per-user location within the user’s profile. For example, if an application attempts to write to “C:\program files\appname\settings.ini” and the user doesn’t have permissions to write to that directory, the write will get redirected to “C:\Users\username\AppData\Local\VirtualStore\Program Files\appname\.”

There are a number of security and safety features new to Windows Vista, most of which are not available in any prior Microsoft Windows operating system release.
Beginning in early 2002 with Microsoft's announcement of its Trustworthy Computing initiative, a great deal of work has gone into making Windows Vista a more secure operating system than its predecessors. Internally, Microsoft adopted a "Security Development Lifecycle"〔
〕 with the underlying ethos of "Secure by design, secure by default, secure in deployment". New code for Windows Vista was developed with the SDL methodology, and all existing code was reviewed and refactored to improve security.
Some specific areas where Windows Vista introduces new security and safety mechanisms include User Account Control, parental controls, Network Access Protection, a built-in anti-malware tool, and new digital content protection mechanisms.
==User Account Control==
(詳細はshatter attacks, which intercept Windows inter-process messages to run malicious code or spoof the user interface, by preventing unauthorized processes from sending messages to high privilege processes. Any process that wants to send a message to a high privilege process must get itself elevated to the higher privilege context, via UAC.
Applications written with the assumption that the user will be running with administrator privileges experienced problems in earlier versions of Windows when run from limited user accounts, often because they attempted to write to machine-wide or system directories (such as ''Program Files'') or registry keys (notably HKLM) UAC attempts to alleviate this using ''File and Registry Virtualization'', which redirects writes (and subsequent reads) to a per-user location within the user’s profile. For example, if an application attempts to write to “C:\program files\appname\settings.ini” and the user doesn’t have permissions to write to that directory, the write will get redirected to “C:\Users\username\AppData\Local\VirtualStore\Program Files\appname\.”

抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア(Wikipedia)
ウィキペディアで「There are a number of security and safety features new to Windows Vista, most of which are not available in any prior Microsoft Windows operating system release.Beginning in early 2002 with Microsoft's announcement of its Trustworthy Computing initiative, a great deal of work has gone into making Windows Vista a more secure operating system than its predecessors. Internally, Microsoft adopted a "Security Development Lifecycle" with the underlying ethos of "Secure by design, secure by default, secure in deployment". New code for Windows Vista was developed with the SDL methodology, and all existing code was reviewed and refactored to improve security.Some specific areas where Windows Vista introduces new security and safety mechanisms include User Account Control, parental controls, Network Access Protection, a built-in anti-malware tool, and new digital content protection mechanisms.==User Account Control==(詳細はUser Account Controlを参照)''User Account Control'' is a new infrastructure that requires user consent before allowing any action that requires administrative privileges. With this feature, all users, including users with administrative privileges, run in a standard user mode by default, since most applications do not require higher privileges. When some action is attempted that needs administrative privileges, such as installing new software or changing system settings, Windows will prompt the user whether to allow the action or not. If the user chooses to allow, the process initiating the action is elevated to a higher privilege context to continue. While standard users need to enter a username and password of an administrative account to get a process elevated (''Over-the-shoulder Credentials''), an administrator can choose to be prompted just for consent or ask for credentials.UAC asks for credentials in a ''Secure Desktop'' mode, where the entire screen is faded out and temporarily disabled, to present only the elevation UI. This is to prevent spoofing of the UI or the mouse by the application requesting elevation. If the application requesting elevation does not have focus before the switch to ''Secure Desktop'' occurs, then its taskbar icon blinks, and when focussed, the elevation UI is presented (however, it is not possible to prevent a malicious application from silently obtaining the focus).Since the ''Secure Desktop'' allows only highest privilege ''System'' applications to run, no user mode application can present its dialog boxes on that desktop, so any prompt for elevation consent can be safely assumed to be genuine. Additionally, this can also help protect against shatter attacks, which intercept Windows inter-process messages to run malicious code or spoof the user interface, by preventing unauthorized processes from sending messages to high privilege processes. Any process that wants to send a message to a high privilege process must get itself elevated to the higher privilege context, via UAC.Applications written with the assumption that the user will be running with administrator privileges experienced problems in earlier versions of Windows when run from limited user accounts, often because they attempted to write to machine-wide or system directories (such as ''Program Files'') or registry keys (notably HKLM) UAC attempts to alleviate this using ''File and Registry Virtualization'', which redirects writes (and subsequent reads) to a per-user location within the user’s profile. For example, if an application attempts to write to “C:\program files\appname\settings.ini” and the user doesn’t have permissions to write to that directory, the write will get redirected to “C:\Users\username\AppData\Local\VirtualStore\Program Files\appname\.”」の詳細全文を読む



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